believe the in theater element is going to be a joint or maybe even a coalition force with a multinational staff at the operational level of logistics.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the Ordnance Corps in the context of emerging future force logistics concepts and to provide recommendations concerning future US Army Ordnance doctrine, organization and material requirements for the 21st Century. The scope of this study will include an examination of conceptual thrusts and basic assumptions concerning future threats, support environments and required capabilities that are being developed and proposed in current FORCE XXI and US Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) future force doctrinal concepts.
The US Army is entering a period of tremendous change. As we move from a post-cold war Army into the future, we face a critical question-how will we fight in the 21st Century? As Ordnance soldiers and logisticians the answers to this question is critical to our nation's security and filled with many challenges and opportunities.
On 23 February 1991 in the predawn desert of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, UN coalition forces led by two US Army Corps executed one of the most stunning, successful and effective ground attacks in modern warfare. The resulting and decisive defeat of the Iraqi forces stemmed from a well planned and executed theater campaign that combined the combined and joint combat and logistics power of the US and coalition forces. What is significant is that this may have represented the culmination of many years of an intellectual and doctrinal journey that fundamentally changed the US Army after its withdrawal from the Republic of South Vietnam and South East Asia in 1975 . In today's post-cold war world of regional, multi-polar military threats and political uncertainty, the US Army again wrestles with the challenge of change to determine the course we will follow as we enter the 21st Century.
Predicting the future is both risky and problematic. It is risky because miscalculations are paid by our young soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. It is problematic because in the history of the US Army we have faced many similar periods of change and have met these challenges with both successes and failures. While the post-Vietnam transformation serves as a recent example of how an Army accomplishes change, the post-World War II era of rapid demobilization accompanied by constrained budgets during a period when the US enjoyed nuclear superiority and status as the world's sole superpower is somewhat similar to today's world situation. The Army's failure in the late 1940's to meet the challenges of the future by maintaining sufficient, combat ready conventional forces (favoring emphasizing strategic nuclear warfare) had some unfavorable consequences in the Korean War of [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] . Today as an Army, we are at a critical stage. The ongoing doctrinal and conceptual debates over Force XXI, the Army of the Future, and future-battle operational dynamic and concepts will affect, not only, how the Army of the 21st Century will fight but also how it will be logistically supported and sustained.
THE ORDNANCE VISION
The role of Ordnance in the future is best described in Ordnance Vision XXI. It is best put by the previous commandant, MG James W. Monroe. As he puts it, "FORCE XXI cannot afford to leave home without Ordnance Vision XXI.
If is does, we will never get there from here. As the 20th Century comes to a close, we'll be facing a very different environment". 1 The next two decades will differ as sharply from the present as the 1960s does from today. 2 We must look vigorously for those places where we are to make bold changes and also at those places where little or no change is needed.
The process of restructuring the 1994 Army into the Army of tomorrow is called FORCE XXI. The central feature of this new Army will be its "ability to exploit and use digitally produced information". 3 We will again be modifying how we fight. Preparing the Ordnance corps to support that force requires a vision;
one that charts and adjusts the critical path to our future organizations, doctrine, materiel requirements and training, all important elements of Ordnance Vision XXI.
Ordnance can no longer be an enabler and provide momentum and substance to Force XXI the way we provided outstanding combat service support to our force of yesterday. We're too slow, too large, too bulky, only reactive, batch processing, demand based and sequential. This was okay for yesterday but for tomorrow-no way! For the future, we'll have to adjust the way we do our functions by leveraging digitally produced logistics information. In the absence of a relatively fixed strategic environment, we are faced with an increasingly complex world that defies authoritative forecasts of the future. We recognize that change is the only real constant. Nevertheless, various schools of thought predict what the 21st Century will look like-the most optimistic being devoid of major war.
We envision the need to establish a national logistics manager or command, responsible for providing all elements of logistical support to the nation's military and civil agencies. 5 Only by consolidating and integrating requirements and capabilities can we maximize our ability to provide support across the entire spectrum of politico-military operations in the 21st Century. To that end, the Ordnance Corps must evolve to meet the challenge of this national logistics scenario.
The vision is to establish the Ordnance Corps as a "world class equipment maintainer, munitions, and explosive ordnance disposal provider in a seamless CSS battle space using situational awareness to take anticipatory and responsive actions." Following the vision, we will remain agile, versatile, and expansible; ready and able to support the national security and military strategies as they span the operational spectrum of the future. The concept is approved and is being introduced to the TRADOC community at large. The less than 3kW generators are under study, since more modern, more mobile and frugal equipment necessitates their use. Improved technology since the 1980's suggest that small and relatively light diesel engines can probably be produced. Canadian 2kW generators are also being tested. The 3kW program, under way for a number of years, has had many problems and has consistently failed three first article tests. The recommendation for this piece of equipment should be to terminate the program, however, the primary production contractor is being given an opportunity to overcome the difficulties. The larger tactical generators, 5-60 kW, following six years of work on 27 separate and distinct configurations, is fast approaching the pre-procurement stage to award a competitive post-production contract. coupled with the reports from the field and concerns from the field clearly supports the concept of changing and enhancing the mission and structure of the CSSAMOs.
The new structure provides a support structure that is staffed, trained, and equipped to maintain and sustain the Army's automated systems. Resourcing for these courses was obtained through tradeoff arrangements.
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Under direction from Headquarters TRADOC, Advanced Individual
Training(AIT) courses were reduced by ten percent. Unlike the fiscal year 1991 mandated ten percent reduction, HQ TRADOC directed that the course lengths and instructor requirements be reduced by a predetermined aggregate number, but that the schools had the option of taking the cuts as they saw best.
Ordnance School decided to make major reductions to the Light Wheeled When these various future force concepts are synthesized, the US Army of the early 21st Century will be predominately CONUS based force projection army that is organized and equipped to be flexible, tailorable and expansible, strategically deployable and effectively employable across the spectrum of future based environments. 
FUTURE DOCTRINE
In studying future force and doctrinal thoughts and concepts, it is easy to be swept away by the alluring jargon and comfortable simplicity of "future speak".
In proposing future U. S. Army Ordnance doctrine, organization and equipment, it is critical to remember that regardless of the future war models, the basic mission of ordnance will not change. The support and sustainment of armies in future wars will continue to be accomplished in the terrible crucible of battle with all the frictions, attending fears, deprivations and constraints that only war provides.
Doctrine is the major driver of future change in the US Army and logistics doctrinal changes should be evolutionary and not revolutionary. This note of caution stems from the suspicion that if the US Army commits to a future doctrine that cannot be sufficiently funded or relies on technologies that cannot be obtained-then it will be doomed to failure. Consequently, future Ordnance doctrine must be based on the fundamental premise that it must be both effective in supporting the Army of the 21st Century and feasible.
Future doctrine must continue to emphasize flexibility and adaptiveness.
As future technologies provide increased management capabilities and asset visibility, theater centralized control of CSS planning and operations will become possible and desirable. Centralization of Theater Army CSS control and management supports the envisioned increased operation and support tempos.
A single logistics manager in the theater exercising asset visibility over theater supplies, transport, maintenance and coalition capabilities should be the objective and the standard. This should lead to a more accountable, responsive and proactive system of assured logistics. This concept is equally applicable in the mature and immature theaters and particularly adaptable in contingency operations.
FUTURE FORCE DESIGN
Ordnance units must be manned, organized, trained, and equipped to conduct successful sustainment operations in a high tempo, mechanized theater- 
FUTURE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
Future-force material requirements and recommendations fall in a number of broad categories: improved strategic lift; improved CSS transportation;
improved automation, communications and data transfer capabilities and identification procurement and stockpiling of critical war reserve stockage of long lead components and items.
While considerable attention is naturally paid to the development and procurement of strategic airlift programs, lesser is provided to current sealift improvement programs. It is essential in the near term that current sealift improvement programs be adequately funded to ensure that the US retains preeminence in strategic deployment into the 21st Century. During ODS over 90% of the Army supplies and equipment were sent by ships which accounted for 523 ship loads of over 26.9 million square feet of cargo space delivering over 2.11 million s/tons of supplies and equipment. 26 Although these totals are impressive, it should serve as a reminder that even in spite of all the money spent during the 1980's to improve sealift capabilities, that during ODS there were insufficient large RO/RO ships to adequately support the deployment and that the Ready Reserve Fleet was less than adequate. 27 Concerning CSS equipment shortfalls and shortages, the 22d SUPCOM After Action Report states succinctly that, "a large theater and an offensive scenario requires more transportation equipment than currently available ."
Concerning off road mobility the report further stated "Enhanced off road capability of transportation assets is necessary". items is the question that must be continually assessed and reviewed.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the challenges of change will be accomplished by a combination of cautious hindsight, visionary foresight and determined convictions. The Ordnance Corps is indeed able to meet the projected future force requirements. The changes required that will transform the US Army and the Ordnance Corps will not be driven simply by the lessons of the past. In this respect history provided a tantalizing hint of the future while serving to provide a foundation upon which to build. Changes to current CSS doctrine should be evolutionary to ensure that the resulting future CSS doctrine organizations and materiel are mission effective and fiscally attainable. How we meet this challenge will be the legacy we leave to the U. S. Army and to the logisticians of the 21st Century.
